

Marx and Schmitt Vs. Democracy

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Abstract:

The political is a polemological activity. It involves the presence of friends and enemies which means the centrality of those who are with you and those who are against you. In *The Concept of the Political* Schmitt identifies as the “high points of politics” those moments in which “the enemy is... recognized as the enemy.”

For the German philosopher, since the Enlightenment, the progressive historical conjunction of liberalism and democracy has obscured this conception. Indeed, democracy rests on discussion and the compromise of shifting majority rules. By the universalism implicit in its claims for toleration and equality, democracy challenges the very essence of the political, i.e. a struggle for power.

As Schmitt noted, “the political adversaries of a clear political theory will easily refute it in the name of some autonomous discipline as amoral, uneconomical, unscientific and above all declare this a devilry worthy of being combated”. The enemy turns into a “disturber of peace”, an “outlaw of humanity”.

This quote can be applied to Marx's political thoughts. Even if he eventually considered Revolution in elective ways, Marx apprehended his whole philosophy as being scientific: the abolishment of private property would ineluctably come with the rise of the communist society after the proletarian Revolution.

As Schmitt, Marx did not distinguish adversaries from enemies. Doing so, both failed to understand the core ideas of democracy: pluralism. War is not “simply a continuation of political intercourse”. Conversely, democracy is the civilized frame for the fundamental nonrationality of the political.

Introduction:

As R. Aron (1987) wrote in his dissertation, 'the traditional philosophy of history finds its achievement in Hegel's system. The modern philosophy of History begins with the refusal of Hegelianism'¹, that's to say with the refusal of a rationality at work in History.

The recent war on terror and the worldwide upsurge of conflicts (for which religion is - as it has always been - only a veil behind secularist political goals) has sounded the death knell for the putative end of history and ideology. Like XIXth century positivist philosophers, Fukuyama (1989) did not understand that Man's history hardly followed a Brownian trend towards progress but remained undoubtedly a tragedy - as Aron said² - in which conflicts played a key role. If it was naive to think so before the Shoah, since then - and especially after the question raised by Adorno 'How to think after the Shoah?' - it should be considered as lethal innocence. Actually, the utopian dream to erase conflict constitutes an aporia and forecloses the distinctive nature of the political.

The political is a polemological activity. If Hegel thought contradiction and negation in a new way³, he stayed on the metaphysical crest of the political. According to us, Hegel did not really understand it. Under the extending wave of Hegelian Reason, the possibility of a dialectical general peace was to lead to the progressive end of any forms of violence. Hence the famous Hegelian aphorism: 'everything that is rational is real, and everything that is real is rational'. Slowly but surely the Hegelian enemy would have to turn into a contradiction charged with the positivity of the third term, the negation of the negation.

Few philosophers applied conflict and contradiction to real politics. A German political philosopher, Carl Schmitt did so. He applied conflicts clearly and usefully through the friend-enemy distinction in his most influential work, *The concept of the political*, written in 1932.

It is obvious that Carl Schmitt was a prominent political thinker. It is widely acknowledged also that Carl Schmitt joined the Nazi Party in 1933, published several anti-Semitic works and supported the Nazi regime. Actually, for good reasons, Schmitt is considered to be the Martin Heidegger of political theory. But Carl Schmitt's writings are fruitful for political theory and philosophy. We can not neglect them and we can not use them apologetically to justify his life. That's why we should read Schmitt today in spite of the so-called "deliberative" or "dialogic" forms of democracy' implemented by a 'reflexive modernity' (Mouffe, 1999, p.1).

However, before Schmitt, another German philosopher had tried to disclose a specific opposition in the political field. A disciple of Hegel's, Marx presented, after some French socialists, a dialectical or a so-called dialectical reality opposing two antagonistic classes. But as it is well known, this opposition had to end soon.

Unlike Geras (1990), we don't think Marxism and socialism are 'dead'. When one realizes how inspirational was Marx for contemporary ideologies (feminism, fundamentalism, multiculturalism, ecologism...), he can hardly agree on the sterility of the fecund field opened by the German philosopher.

(1) « La philosophie traditionnelle de l'histoire trouve son achèvement dans le système de Hegel. La philosophie moderne de l'histoire commence par le refus de l'hégélianisme. » R. Aron, Introduction to *Philosophie critique de l'histoire*, Julliard, Paris, 1987. We can say it echoes what P. Valéry wrote in *Variété* (1924): « We modern civilizations have learned to recognize that we are mortal like the others ».

(2) « Oui, l'histoire est la tragédie d'une humanité qui fait son histoire, mais qui ne sait pas l'histoire qu'elle fait. » Introduction by Raymond Aron to the 1959 traduction of *Du Savant et du Politique* by Marx Weber (Plon).

(3) We exclude Heraclitus from whom we only have philosophical *Fragments* and Laozi from whom we have only aphorisms gathered in the *Tao Te Ching*.

The invocation of the end of history and the triumph of liberal capitalism forces us to re-examine both Marx and Schmitt. The purpose of this paper is to articulate an analysis of Schmitt's and Marx's philosophies around the friend-enemy conception. In *L'individu chez Marx (The individual in Marx's philosophy, Cailleba, 2005)*, we distinguished three different phases in Marx's works. Following a normative tradition initiated by L. Althusser (1965) and enriched by M. Henry (1976), we organized our argumentation around the years 1843 and 1845. Doing so we identified three autonomous and different Marxian philosophies, each one based on a specific figure of man⁴.

For this paper, we will focus on what we identified as the third and most known Marxian philosophy: historical materialism. The *opus magnum* which founded this philosophy (only to be published after Marx's death) was *The German ideology*. From 1845 to his death, Marx tried to apply his main philosophical views to the fields of economics, politics and sociology.

1. Schmitt & Marx: some similarities

Many traits of Schmitt's political thought are present in Marx's philosophy. A heir of Hegelian dialectic, Marx used the concept of contradiction plainly to apply it to History.

1.1 - The Friend-Enemy Distinction and Class Struggle

In the *Concept of the Political*, Schmitt expressly desists from providing an 'exhaustive definition' of the political. He argues that (Schmitt, 1996, p.25-26):

In contrast to the various relatively independent endeavours of human thought and action, particularly in the moral, aesthetic, and economic, the political has its own criteria which express themselves in a characteristic way.

This specific criterion, the criterion of the political, is 'that between friend and enemy'. The criteria in question have the character of 'ultimate distinctions', or, more accurately, of ultimate 'oppositions'.

Therefore if the criterion of the moral is the 'antithesis of good and evil', the criterion of the aesthetic, the antithesis of beautiful and ugly, etc., the specifically political criterion is 'the distinction of friend and enemy'. Nevertheless none of the antithesis can be directly reduced to the others. Then 'the antithesis of friend and enemy must even less be confused with or mistaken for the others' (Schmitt, 1996, p.35):

Politics involves friends and enemies, the centrality of those who are with you and those against whom you struggle. Fighting and the possibility of death are necessary for there to be the political.

'Enemy' must always be understood only as the 'public enemy', i.e. 'a collectivity of people' fighting another collectivity of people. The enemy is not the 'private adversary whom one hates' (Schmitt, 1996, p.28):

the enemy is *hostis*, not *inimicus* in the broader sense; *πολέμιος*, not *ἐχθρός*.⁵

(4) Rationalist-liberal humanism (articles written for the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher*, but also *On the Jewish Question*, and the famous *Introduction to Hegel's Political Philosophy critique*) between 1843 and 1844; Dialectical Naturalism (mainly based on the *Philosophical Manuscripts* of 1844, and *The Holy Family*) between 1844 and 1845; and then Historical Materialism from 1845 to 1883.

(5) Schmitt adds in a footnote: 'in his *Republic* (V, XVI, 470), Plato strongly emphasizes the contrast between the public enemy (*πόλεμιος*) and the private one (*ἐχθρός*), but in connection with the other antithesis of war (*πόλεμος*) and insurrection, upheaval, rebellion, civil war (*στάσις*)'.

The German philosopher even refers to the New Testament where he often quoted 'Love your enemies' (Matt. 5:44; Luke 6:27) is translated from the latin *diligite inimicos vestros* and not *diligite hostes vestros*.

As for Marx, it is not very different. The equivalent concept to the Schmittian 'friend enemy distinction' is the well-known 'class struggle'⁶ (Marx, 1977, p.161):

The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles

The relations of different nations among themselves depend upon the extent to which each has developed its productive forces, the division of labour. But not only the relation of one nation to others, but also the whole internal structure of the nation itself depends on the stage of development reached by its production and its internal and external intercourse. This division of labour implies a relation of exploitation between oppressor and oppressed, each being subsumed in two and antagonistic classes. The concept of class struggle holds that in class-divided societies there are incompatible social interests that lead to exploitation and antagonism. The separation of society into opposed classes generates a war which turns an economic opposition into a political struggle. The opposing classes at stakes are: Labour and Capital.

Capital is composed of the bourgeoisie or capitalists in the XIXth century. It includes anyone who gets their income not from labor as much as from the surplus value they appropriate from the workers who create wealth. In short, they are the owners of the means of social production and employers of wage labour. Therefore the income of capitalists is based on their exploitation of the proletariat⁷.

Labour is composed of the proletariat or workers in the XIXth century. It includes anyone who has no means of production of their own, earns their livelihood by selling their labour power and being paid a wage or salary for their labor time.

Oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted fight, a fight that each time ended, either in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes (Marx, 1982, p.1053):

The separate individuals form a class only insofar as they have to carry on a common battle against another class.

We can say that Marx even anticipated Schmitt's difference between public and private enemy. For the German philosopher, there is only one public enemy defined by his social class. People from the same social class can not be public enemies but only private enemies (when they are competing for the same job) and mainly 'misery brothers'. Hence, the bourgeois and the proletarian are undoubtedly Schmittian public enemies.

Less than 50 years after Marx's death, Schmitt seemed to find in the class struggle the perfect political and philosophical example of his friend enemy distinction (Schmitt, 1996, p.74):

The most conspicuous and historically the most effective example is the antithesis formulated by Karl Marx: bourgeoisie and proletariat. This antithesis concentrates all antagonisms of world history into one single final battle against the last enemy of humanity. It does so by integrating the many bourgeois parties on earth into a single order, on the one hand, and likewise the proletariat, on the other. By so doing a mighty friend-enemy grouping is forged.

(6) The concept of Class comes directly from the Roman Empire where the Roman laws referred to different classes based on a tax qualification. François Quesnay used it in the XVIIIth century (*Tableau économique avec son explication, ou extrait des économies royales de Sully*, 1758). The French economist distinguished the productive classes of the landowners and farmers of land, and the unproductive class composed of manufacturers and merchants. Then, Lorenz von Stein (*Der Sozialismus und Communismus des heutigen Frankreich*, 1842) wrote about this theme. But it is mainly Hegel who inspired Marx thanks to his *Philosophy of right* in which Hegel used the term of Class (*Stand*, State) and identified (§§243-245) some of them: the rich one and the Popular one [*Pöbel*].

(7) Marx confessed in a letter to F. Engels in 1882 that (Society Must be Defended by Michel Foucault (trans. David Macey), London: Allen Lane, Penguin Press (1976, 2003), p. 79): 'You know very well where we found our idea of class struggle; we found it in the work of the French historians who talked about the race struggle.'¹ Before the XIXth century, Capital was represented by feudal lords (the Middle Ages) and patricians (Roman and Greek antiquity). Labour gathered roman slaves and plebeians in the Ancient Greece and Rome; then serfs and apprentice during the Middle Ages.

1.2 - The ontological dimension of conflict and individual consciousness

For both philosophers, war or revolution bear the hallmark of ineluctability. Even if the Schmittian war may be only a potential one, 'war follows from enmity' (Schmitt, 1996, p.33). For Schmitt and Marx, if conflict and contradiction are the essence of the political, they do not have to be common and normal. War is not part and parcel of daily life. Only conflict is.

Marx and Schmitt well understood that ontological dimension. Man is a political being whose essence needs the friend enemy distinction to complete his destiny (Schmitt, 1996, p.35).

a world in which the possibility of war is utterly eliminated... would be... a world without politics

A human being is a political being. Thus he can not escape from his deep essence. All human dimensions - religion, economics, ethics... - gather, merge and finally transform into a political one which arises as a conflict.

The question at stake now becomes: are people responsible for what they do? As Strong wrote (Schmitt, 1996, p.xvii), 'Is it possible for man to escape the hold of an ethical universalism?' Schmitt clearly thought that it was possible. People are only responsible for what they are even if the reality of death and conflict remains present (Schmitt, 1996, 77). Ethics is excluded from such a view. Schmitt promotes the universality of conflict and war. He does not promote the universal possibility of an ethical behaviour.

In *The concept of the Political*, Schmitt identifies as the 'high points of politics' those moments in which 'the enemy is, in concrete clarity, recognized as the enemy' (Schmitt, 1996, p.67). One aspect of this claim worthy of note is the semi-Hegelian form it assumes. The concrete recognition of the other as enemy and the consequent establishment of one's own identity sounds something like Hegel's Master and Slave, especially if read with a Kojévian approach. But only the form is Hegelian. Indeed, politics is fundamentally nonrational. Rationality - what is rational for a group to do to preserve itself as a group - is not only not universal but hard to know. And there is no criterium given by Schmitt to identify an enemy.

For Marx, it is clear as well. In the *German Ideology* (1845), he asserts that consciousness is from the very beginning a social product, and remains so as long as men exist: 'Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life' (Marx, 1982, p.1057). Consciousness is merely consciousness concerning the immediate sensuous environment and consciousness of the limited connection with other persons and things outside the individual who is growing self-conscious. Years later, Marx moderated his words in the preface to the *Capital* (Marx, 1977, p.550):

Here individuals are dealt with only in so far as they are the personifications of economic categories, embodiments of particular class-relations and class-interests.

Nevertheless, this personification of specific categories appears in all his works and tends to synthesize it. Unfortunately Marx does not explain how people should or could be considered in a different way.

1.3 - Liberalism is the culprit

For both philosophers, liberalism and capitalism pervert the concept of political and so their concept of human kind.

According to Schmitt, liberalism destroys democracy. Because it wants to solve and erase conflicts, liberalism evades state and politics. Liberalism promotes a new polarity instead of the previous opposition. 'Ethics and economics, intellect and trade, education and poverty' (Schmitt, 1996, p.70) are the new opposing couples. War turns into competitions in the domain of economic and discussion in the intellectual realm. State and politics are then deprived of their specific meaning in order to secure liberty.

Liberalism lets people think that the sacrifice of life is in no way justifiable. It subjugates politics into smooth and soft oppositions. The public enemy disappears little by little. Only remains the private competitor within a perpetual competition or a perpetual discussion.

For Marx, capitalism is the economic face of liberalism. It is the final step which gathers the paroxysmal contradictions of History. Capitalism represents a plague for humanity owing to the exploitation it has been sustaining and the suffering it has been generating until Marx's time. That's why History should and will make it end.

Therefore one can see that for both philosophers liberalism perverts the political for exactly the opposite reason. Schmitt talks about the end of the conflict which threatens the very meaning of politics. Liberalism constitutes the main reason for such decay. Meanwhile Marx talks about a capitalist society which reaches its climax while concentrating the conditions of a final and violent conflict: the Revolution.

This point opens a new field. It lets us understand how, in spite of their apparent similarities, Marx and Schmitt greatly differ in their conception of the political.

2. Schmitt & Marx: their differences

Even if Schmitt and Marx seem to agree on the analysis they make about the political, they disagree on the solution one should give to solve this situation.

2.1 - A Marxian antagonistic vision to correct

Schmitt used to think that Marx's class struggle constituted a good example of his friend-enemy dimension. Nevertheless, as R. Aron observed (2002, p.255), Marx's thought about classes evolved significantly. The simplistic vision of two antagonist classes in Marx's philosophy must be corrected.

This evolution can be noted in the political and sociological texts, *The Class struggles in France, 1848 to 1850* and *The 18th Brumaire of Louis Napoléon*, published in 1851. Three years after the Manifesto, Marx presented six or seven different classes (Marx, 1994, pp.238, 241, 266, 273) which composed French society: the Aristocracy, the Industrial Bourgeoisie, the 'Small' Bourgeoisie, the Working Class, the *Lumpenproletariat*, the Landowners and the Peasantry. The last two classes were still the most important in France, as in all other countries at that time (except England). Then in the *Capital* published in 1867, Marx talked about 3 different classes: the Capital, the Proletariat and the Land owners (Marx, 1968, p.1484-1485). Each was defined by its own particular type of wage: salary for the worker, profit for the capitalist and land rent for the landowner.

So in less than three years, Marx added five major classes to his famous analysis. This addendum complicates a little the concept of an antagonistic society and offers instead a polycentric field of divergent interests. Anyway, Marx preferred to focus on the two main antagonist classes that shaped, according to him, history.

Moreover, for Marx the conflict is mainly a social and economic one. It means that it takes place within particular societies – the most industrialized ones – and can appear in other countries when the conditions are there. Contradiction has first an internal and domestic signification: the bourgeois and the proletarians live in the same country and share the same conditions with their counterparts outside their country. Hence the sense of the last sentence of the *Manifesto*: ‘Workers of all countries, Unite’ (Marx, 1977).

For Schmitt, the conflict is only inter-national. War is the privilege of Nations and States as ‘state = politics’ (Schmitt, 1996, p.22). Indeed, ‘the intensification of internal antagonisms has the effect of weakening the common identity vis-à-vis another state’ (1996, p.32) and leads to ‘civil war’, which Schmitt definitely rejects. It means that the possibility of dying for one’s State is the most important and political thing, ‘the final determining quality of the human’ as Strong observed (1996, p.xvii). This is unconceivable for Marx since the ruling state is the very tool of the ruling class. Indeed, the basis of the conflict between Capital and Proletariat comes from the inequality of the economic exploitation, whereas for Schmitt all can be summed up and meet its end in the political conflict (1996, p.38):

The real friend-enemy grouping is existentially so strong and decisive that the non political antithesis, at precisely the moment at which it becomes political, pushes aside and subordinates its hitherto purely religious, purely economic, purely cultural criteria and motives to the conditions and conclusions of the political situation at hand.

2.2 - The bourgeois society Vs. Liberalism

Consequently, when the political and economic conditions changed, Marx changed his point of view too. If violent revolutions were anticipated and justified in an undemocratic political context, Marx finally excluded this violence whenever parliamentary elections could be held and universal suffrage could be respected.

After the return of democracy in France in the 1870s, Marx refused to refer to violent meanings. In *Considerations about the French Working Party Program* (1880), he urged the working class to use legal rights in order to promote social progress and to avoid a violent revolution (Marx, 1977, p.1538). Concerning the English case in 1883, Marx wrote in a letter to Hyndman, an English socialist, that if the peaceful and legal evolution turned into a violent revolution, it would be due to the inability of both the ruling class and the working class (Marx, 1977, p.clxx). Finally in a new introduction to the *Class struggles in France* (1895), Engels underlined the great successes obtained by the German proletariat thanks to the legal means of parliamentarianism and universal suffrage. Then, revolution could be avoided and violence contained in Marx’s philosophy.

According to Schmitt, such an evolution is only compromise and it undermines politics. Indeed, liberalism has neutralized politics. Liberalism has failed because it negated the political without eliminating it.

Modern bourgeois politics is a system which rests on compromise (Ellen Kennedy, 1987, p.42). All of its solutions are thus in the end temporary and never decisive. Such arrangements can scarcely resolve

the claims of equality inherent in democracy. By the universalism implicit in its claims for equality, democracy challenges the legitimacy of the political order, as liberal legitimacy rests on discussion and the compromise of shifting majority rules. Politics cannot be made safe and the attempt to make politics safe will result in the abandonment of the state to private interests. So, liberalism tends to undermine the possibility of the political in that it wishes to substitute procedure for struggle.

The present situation is characterized by the fact that a process which started in the XVIth century has reached its end. According to Schmitt, we live an 'age of neutralization and depoliticizations'. Depoliticization is not an accident of liberalism but it is its original and authentic goal.

For Schmitt, the possibility of war does not merely constitute the political as such: war is not merely 'the most extreme political measure'. War is the dire emergency because war has and retains a 'relationship to the real possibility of physical killing' as Leo Strauss observed (Schmitt, 1996, p.88). Nevertheless, even if war is ineluctable (1996, p.34):

war is neither the aim nor the purpose nor even the very content of politics. But as an ever present possibility it is the leading presupposition which determines in a characteristic way human action and thinking and thereby creates a specifically political behaviour.

2.3 - The vision of the State

For Schmitt, "the concept of the State presupposes the concept of the political" (1996, p.19). The conclusion of the Schmittian syllogism is quite clear: the friend-enemy distinction constitutes the basic fundament of the State. That's to say the political explains and justifies the State. As long as the ontological dimension of the political remains, the State will exist.

As regards Marx, this is totally the opposite. The State forms the basis for the political, that's to say for exploitation. The practical struggle of particular interests, which constantly really run counter to the communal and illusory communal interests, makes practical intervention and control necessary through the illusory 'general' interest in the form of the State.

Since the State is the form in which the individuals of a ruling class assert their common interests, it follows that the State mediates in the formation of all common institutions and that the institutions receive a political form. Hence the illusion that law is based on the will, and indeed on the will divorced from its real basis - on free will. That's untrue since the State always serves the ruling class by helping it perpetuate the exploitation of the proletariat and class struggle. Then the Marxian State, before the revolution, is the condition of the class struggle, the origin of evil. But after the revolution all changes.

For Schmitt, the political is a basic characteristic of human life: politics in this sense is destiny. Man cannot escape politics. As J. Freund observed, 'if there are political revolutions, there is no revolution within the political' (2004, p.ix).

Therefore the opposition between the negation and the position of the political can be traced back to a quarrel over human nature. Strauss noted that the ultimate controversy is whether man is by nature good or evil (Schmitt, 1996, p.95). A heir of Machiavelli, Schmitt thinks that 'all genuine political theories' presuppose man's dangerousness. Accordingly, the thesis of man's dangerousness is the ultimate presupposition of the political.

For Marx, it is quite ambiguous. If Man before Revolution is totally determined by social and economic

conditions, after the Revolution all determinations shall end in the communist society. There Man will be freed from any exploitation and will live in a society where conflicts have disappeared. And so will the State. Engels's famous sentence becomes quite clear in that way: 'the government of people [that's to say the way to manage and solve conflicts] will be replaced by the administration of things' (1884). In a previous paper (Cailleba, 2005), we called this change in the human essence a 'transubstantiation' because doing so Man would totally change his own essence from determination to freedom. Which seems quite impossible without God's help.

Of course, Schmitt by no means repudiates this ideal as utopian (1996, p.57).

in the belief... that things would administer themselves, and that a government by people over people would be superfluous because human beings would then be absolutely free. For what would they be free?

Schmitt pretends, after all, that he does not know whether such a thing – a society without a friend enemy distinction – cannot be realized. But he does abhor it. If the distinction between friend and enemy ceases even as a mere possibility, there would only be a politics-free *weltanschauung*, culture, civilization, economy, morals, law, art, etc. But there would be neither politics nor State. A definitively pacified globe would be a world without politics. In such a world there could be various, perhaps very interesting, oppositions and contrasts competitions and intrigues of all kinds, but no opposition on the basis of which it could sensibly be demanded of men that they sacrifice their lives (1996, p.71).

3. Schmitt & Marx: how they threat democracy

3.1 - Marx's Christian vision of Man

We saw before that Marx finally promoted and supported parliamentarianism and universal suffrage in the most advanced countries of the XIXth century. If force was still necessary, violence was useless in a democratic society. Universal suffrage constitutes the difference between force and violence⁸.

Anyway, whether it is an evolution or a revolution⁹, conflict for Marx will be erased from the table of History. Marx is a Christian philosopher who deeply thinks that all men can and will agree on everything. The communist society is no more than the Christian paradise revisited by Marx, a brotherhood of men.

Schmitt clearly understood Marx's insane vision. When Schmitt referred to Marx's revolution, he condemned this purity of intentions which is too often dangerous in politics (Schmitt, 1996, p.37-38):

Should the proletariat succeed in seizing political power within a state, a proletarian state will thus have been created. This state is by no means less of a political power than a national state, a theocratic, mercantile, or soldier state, a civil service state, or some other type of political entity.

Schmitt wants to remove from politics, especially international politics but also internal politics of an ideological kind, any possibility of justifying one's action on the basis of a claim to universal moral principles.

(8) Nevertheless, owing to the fact that Marx dedicated an important part of his work to the necessity of a violent revolution, we must analyse this point as well. As 'revolution is the main engine of History' (Marx, 1982, p.1071), it is at the same time 'a violent and democratic' (1971, p.431) process during which the class struggle and exploitation meet their end. But this necessary 'revolutionary terrorism' (1994, p.76) is compulsory only when other legal means are negated.

(9) Moreover, the 'dictatorship of proletariat' is a term mainly employed by Marxists that refers to a temporary state between the capitalist society and the classless and stateless communist society. Marx used it few times.

He does so because he fears that in such a framework all claims to good will recognize no limits to their reach. As Schmitt noted, 'the political adversaries of a clear political theory will easily refute it in the name of some autonomous discipline as amoral, uneconomic, unscientific and above all declare this a devilry worthy of being combated'. Killing in the name of moral values simultaneously degrades the enemy and makes of him a monster that must not only be defeated but also utterly destroyed. The enemy turns into a 'disturber of peace', an 'outlaw of humanity'. Strong noted that (Schmitt, 1996, p.xxii) Nietzsche in *Ecce Homo* anticipated such 'wars for the domination of the earth', that is to say wars to determine one and for all what is good for all, wars with no outcome except an end to politics and the elimination of all difference (Schmitt, 1996, p.33-34).

the definition of the political suggested here neither favors war nor militarism, neither imperialism nor pacifism" Nor is it an attempt to idealize the victorious war or the successful revolution as a 'social ideal', since neither war nor revolution is something social or something ideal.

The inescapability of the political is displayed in the contradiction in which man necessarily becomes entangled if he attempts to eliminate the political. Thus the effort to abolish the political for the sake of humanity has as its necessary consequence nothing other than the increase of inhumanity (the 'war against war'). Man ceases to be a man when he ceases to be political. The political is inescapable as long as there is just one political opposition, even just as a possibility.

3.2 - Schmitt's irrational vision of politics

Unlike Marx, Schmitt was far from being a democrat. Schmitt did not conceive sovereignty as something each individual might have but rather as the exercise of power by the state. The rationality of politics is to have no rationality for Schmitt whereas for Marx the current irrationality (suffering and misery generated by exploitation) is orchestrated in back stage by History which will finally implement a rational society, *i.e.* the communist society.

In his famous essay *On Dictatorship (Die Diktatur, 1921)*, Schmitt discussed the foundations of the newly established Weimar Republic. For the philosopher, if a government wanted to be able of decisive action, it had to include a dictatorial element within its constitution. The state of emergency gave the *Reichspräsident* no legal restraints for a limited time. As in ancient Rome, it suspended laws and set a 'sovereign dictatorship' in order to 'save the constitution' by giving absolute powers to a dictator during a period of emergency.

The Schmitt authoritarian theories were enriched when he published *Political Theology (Politische Theologie, 1922)* which begins with the notorious definition: 'Sovereign is he who decides on the exception'. The political is the 'authoritative'. Whereas the 'central domains' change (theology, metaphysics, morals, economy or technology), the political constantly remains destiny. The political is the arena of authority rather than general law and requires decisions which are singular, absolute and final as Strong observed (Schmitt, 1996, p.xiv).

Here we reach what has been called the Schmittian decisionism. It means that under certain circumstances the realization of right depends on a political decision without normative content. From an ethical and political perspective, it does not imply that such a decision does reject values and norms but that they can be suspended. Hence the convincing accusations of Nietzschean elements in Schmitt (Wolin, *Political Theory* 20, n°3).

So what does it mean to go beyond good and evil? If politics is not moral, what can the norms and the rules be.

Some political philosophers like Strauss thought that the affirmation of the political is ultimately nothing other than the affirmation of the moral. So Schmitt would have, albeit unwillingly, moralized even his would-be amorality. How?

The affirmation of fighting is wholly irrespective of what is being fought for. Indeed, he who affirms the political as the primacy of the political over the moral respects all who want to fight. In other words: he who affirms the political as such behaves himself neutrally toward all groupings into friends and enemies. He respects all who want to fight. He is just as tolerant as the liberals but with the opposite intention. Whereas the liberal respects and tolerates all 'honest' convictions so long as they merely acknowledge the legal order, peace, as sacrosanct, he who affirms the political as such respects and tolerates all 'serious' convictions, that is, all decisions oriented to the real possibility of war (Schmitt, 1996, p.105-106).

According to Strauss, the affirmation of the political as Schmitt does proves to be a liberalism with the opposite polarity. Schmitt's opposite liberalism is no more than tolerance for the intolerant as long as the enemy does not directly threaten me or wage war on me. Schmitt does not promote nor defend democracy but only politics. He just promotes stability in international politics. Such a position can be challenged nowadays with the development of international terrorism.

Indeed, we can make a difference between criminal violence and political violence, even if today terrorism has introduced a new type of violence. J. Freund named it anomical violence (from *nomos*: rule, *anomical*: without rule). Terrorism can be defined as the asymmetrical political strategy of violence from the weak to the strong. In terrorism, we can not clearly distinguish if violence is only political or criminal. Moreover, this violence can appear without reason, in the very absence of conflict situations in the place hit. So a position of tolerance against intolerance must be dangerous and cowardly because it threatens sooner or later the nation which holds such a position.

Last but not least, as Strauss noted 'of the two elements of the friend-enemy mode of viewing things, the "enemy" element manifestly takes precedence' (Schmitt, 1996, p.88). So we don't clearly know what a friend is (1996, p.37)

the political does not reside in the battle itself, which possesses its own technical, psychological, and military law, but in the mode of behaviour which is determined by this possibility, by clearly evaluating the concrete situation and thereby being able to distinguish correctly the real friend and the real enemy.

Concerning Marx's enemy, it is quite simple and that one slowly disappears in the parliament. But for Schmitt, it puts higher fears on the irrationality of its decisionism and higher threats on democracy. A friend remains an eternal potential enemy. And conversely, an enemy remains an eternal potential friend.

But the question which remains is: does it put higher threats on democracy? Well, if we can all agree that democracy should be rational, actually we must confess it is not. That was what Schmitt understood in spite of his anti-liberalism and his focus on political irrationality.

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